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Maritime Security in Indonesia: Towards a comprehensive agenda? 
 
Ioannis Chapsos1 and James A. Malcolm2 
Centre for Trust, Peace & Social Relations, Coventry University, 
Innovation Village Building No. 5, Cheetah Road, Coventry, CV1 2TL, 
United Kingdom 
 
Abstract: 
 
Against the backdrop of Indonesian President Widodo’s expressed intention to 
turn his country in to a maritime nation again, this article examines the way in 
which the Indonesian state understands and utilises the concept of maritime 
security. The article achieves this aim by discussing the results of a Training 
Needs Analysis of key Indonesian state maritime security actors, conducted as 
part of the first phase of a multi-stakeholder project examining how Indonesia’s 
maritime security capacity can be improved. The article illustrates how key 
maritime actors within the Indonesian state demonstrate a diverse 
understanding of what maritime security is, and argues that there is a 
demonstrable willingness on their part to look beyond a narrow 
conceptualisation of security in the maritime domain, which is solely focused 
on military threats and the defence of the state, towards something more 
comprehensive. Here the Indonesian approach to maritime security mirrors in 
practice conceptual trends encapsulated in the emergence of maritime security 
studies. The article concludes that there is the potential for a more 
comprehensive maritime security agenda to take hold in Indonesia but that this 
will require continued strategic and policy focus on the maritime domain 
within the country, alongside an emphasis on partnership building both within 
the state and between the state and non-state actors. Consistent dialogue around 
how maritime security is conceptualised would be helpful in supporting these 
two conditions the article posits, elaborating the value of the human security 
lens for those interested in a more comprehensive approach to maritime 
security. 
 
‘We have to work as hard as possible to turn Indonesia into a maritime 
nation once again. Oceans, seas, straits and bays are the future of our 
civilization. We’ve turned our back on the seas, oceans, straits and bays 
for far too long. It is time for us to realize ‘jalesveva jayamahe,’ ‘in the 
ocean we triumph,’ a motto upheld by our ancestors in the past. We 
want to make that happen again’ (President Joko Widodo, Inauguration 
Speech, 2014) (Jakarta Globe 2014). 
                                                     
1 Corresponding author, Email address: ioannis.chapsos@coventry.ac.uk  
2 Email address: james.malcolm@coventry.ac.uk  
2 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s strategic emphasis on turning his country in to a 
“…maritime nation once again” (Jakarta Globe 2014) has ensured that the security of 
the maritime domain, alongside those efforts to enhance it, have been given greater 
prominence within the country over the past two years. This focus has arguably been 
given added impetus by the work of organisations such as the International 
Organization of Migration, Indonesia (IOM/Indonesia) who have helped to shed light 
on incidents of trafficking on foreign fishing boats operating in Indonesian waters, and 
in doing so have highlighted the tragic consequences for human welfare when 
criminality at sea flourishes.  In one incident for example, an IOM/Indonesia 
assessment conducted in the sprawling port of Ambon, identified hundreds of Myanmar 
nationals as victims of trafficking on foreign fishing boats (IOM 2015b:1). In a second 
incident hundreds of foreign fishermen, who had been victims of trafficking in the 
fisheries sector, were found stranded on the remote eastern island of Benjina. 
Predominantly foreign nationals from Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, the 
fishermen had experienced forced confinement and labour, non-payment of salaries 
despite their excessive working hours, and psychological and physical abuse amounting 
to torture (IOM 2015b:1).   
  
Set against this backdrop a group of stakeholders – Indonesian state and non-state – 
came together in April 2015 to launch a project, ongoing today, titled ‘The Consortium 
for Maritime Security in Indonesia’. The project’s objective is to bring together varied 
stakeholders with an interest in security in the maritime domain, in order to build a 
community of practice (Bueger 2013, Chapsos and Kitchen 2015:2) that can help 
contribute towards improving Indonesia’s maritime security capacity. Its first phase, 
which ran between September 2015 and April 2016, recognised the need to better 
understand how the Indonesian state thinks about maritime security – threats and 
responses. With a base level of understanding in place, the assumption was made that 
it would be possible to more effectively map out the most appropriate ways in which 
capacity could be improved, shaping the project’s subsequent phases. This knowledge 
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was attained through the delivery of several focus groups held in Indonesia involving 
key stakeholders and through the commission of a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) 
targeting key state maritime actors. It is this TNA that the paper focuses on, elaborating 
its development and results in order to provide an up to date case study of how the 
concept of maritime security is understood and utilised in practice today.  
 
Whilst overall key maritime actors within the Indonesian state demonstrate a diverse 
understanding of what maritime security is, the paper argues that there is a 
demonstrable willingness on their part to look beyond a narrow conceptualisation of 
security in the maritime domain, which is solely focused on military threats and the 
defence of the state, towards something more comprehensive. Here the Indonesian 
approach to maritime security mirrors in practice conceptual trends encapsulated in the 
emergence of maritime security studies. More specifically, the TNA captures a general 
awareness of maritime security as a concept but lower awareness amongst state actors 
as to their specific mandate relating to maritime security. The paper also outlines the 
diversity of the perceived maritime security threats highlighted by state actors. Shifting 
to responses, the paper explores which actors are deemed to be of particular importance 
in relation to maritime security. It notes the continued prominence of the Navy, but 
notes a more complex governance situation where the role of multiple state actors and 
indeed non-state actors are recognised, arguing that this illustrates evidence of an 
acknowledgment of the relationship between insecurity at sea and on land. To conclude, 
the paper notes that there is the potential for a more comprehensive maritime security 
agenda to take hold in Indonesia but that this will require continued strategic and policy 
focus on the maritime domain within the country, alongside an emphasis on partnership 
building both within the state and between the state and non-state actors. Consistent 
dialogue around how maritime security is conceptualised would be particularly helpful 
in supporting these two conditions. Here the paper highlights the significant 
contribution the human security concept - with its recognition of multiple security 
sectors and its emphasis on core freedoms – has for those seeking a more 
comprehensive lens through which to approach security in the maritime domain.  
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Structurally the paper’s next section sets out the broader context in which the Indonesia 
capacity-building project was established. Reiterating the emphasis placed on the 
maritime domain by Indonesia’s President, the article positions this trajectory as an 
example of growing strategic thinking by those in government about the oceans and 
their security. This development, the paper notes, is underpinned by a broadening 
conceptualisation of security witnessed in recent decades, replicated in the maritime 
domain, where maritime security studies has emerged. With this complete the paper 
elaborates further on the membership of the Indonesia project’s consortium, sets out 
the parameters of the TNA by outlining its objective and methodology, before attention 
turns to highlighting and discussing the main results of the TNA. It is then that 
conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. New strategies and new thinking in the maritime domain 
 
In his election manifesto in 2014 the then Indonesian Presidential candidate, Joko 
Widodo, promised to focus on maritime security (Shekhar and Liow 2014:2-4). This 
commitment, encapsulated in a broad desire to transform Indonesia in to a ‘global 
maritime axis’, was subsequently affirmed in his October 2014 inauguration speech 
(Jakarta Globe 2014). Since then the idea of Indonesia as a maritime axis has entered 
in to more regular parlance across government. As the General Secretary of the Ministry 
of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Sjarief Widjaja, noted for example in 2015: 
 
“…fighting transnational crime, including people smuggling and human 
trafficking, is key to Indonesia’s maritime security and integral to the 
government’s design to establish Indonesia as a Global Maritime Axis” 
(IOM 2015b: 2). 
 
Indonesia’s renewed focus on its maritime domain represents a further example of a 
trend witnessed in recent years for countries and regional blocs to reflect on the 
maritime dimension to their development and security. The United Kingdom (UK) for 
example published its ‘National Strategy for Maritime Security’ (UK 2014) in May 
2014. This strategy was signed off by four government departments – the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Department 
of Transport – demonstrating significant cross-government engagement, and perhaps 
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unsurprisingly in this context, the strategy embraced a multi-faceted definition of 
maritime security. More specifically, maritime security was defined as: 
 
“…the advancement and protection of the UK’s national interests, at home 
and abroad, through the active management of risks and opportunities in and 
from the maritime domain, in order to strengthen and extend the UK’s 
prosperity, security and resilience and to help shape a stable world.” (UK 
2014: 15) 
 
The UK laid out five maritime security objectives (UK 2014: 9-10). These focused on 
securing the international maritime domain, developing maritime governance capacity, 
protecting overseas territories, securing global trade and energy routes, and protecting 
the UK and its territories against “illegal and dangerous activity, including serious 
organised crime and terrorism” (UK 2014: 10-11). 
 
 
Both the European Union (EU 2014) and the African Union (AU 2014) have also 
published maritime security strategies in recent years, and as with the UK they 
encapsulate a broadening of how maritime security is conceptualised. Each strategy 
firmly highlights the importance of the maritime domain economically, politically, 
environmentally, and culturally, and as such notes more diverse threats associated with 
that domain. Maritime security is now about tackling issues such as illegal fishing or 
smuggling by sea, alongside the inter-state naval operations and broader power politics 
associated with the Cold War. For a country such as Indonesia, the world’s largest 
archipelagic state, this more comprehensive agenda is relevant when, for example, 
tragic incidents of crime in the fishing industry are located in and around its waters. 
 
 
The conceptual shift encapsulated in these maritime security strategies towards a 
widening and deepening of maritime security to encapsulate a growing emphasis on 
non-traditional threats, and the associated interest in the role of non-state actors 
(Chapsos 2016), is perhaps unsurprising when we consider the broadening of the 
security agenda as a whole in the decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Fierke 2007; 
Buzan and Hansen 2009). It is also a shift that has been evident in academic research 
around maritime security where analytically rich work on the composition and 
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deployment of 21st century navies (Till 2009), the role of the BRIC countries as 
emerging maritime powers (Suarez de Vivero and Rodriguez Mateos 2010), or on 
ongoing maritime territorial disputes such as those in the South China Sea (Kraska 
2015), has been joined by an increasing array of studies looking at issues such as piracy 
(Murphy 2009, Shortland 2012), illegal fishing (Octaviana 2014), how we can 
conceptualise port security (Malcolm 2016) or the privatisation of maritime security 
(Liss 2016).  
 
 
There has also been a significant multi-disciplinary dimension to this expanding 
literature with insights from disciplines such as geography integrated in to thinking with 
reflections on the geopolitical dimension of maritime security (Germond 2015, 
Germond 2015a) or critiques of the assumption that oceans are placeless (Germond  and 
Germond-Duret 2016). Indeed, in recent years this proliferation of the issues under 
focus relating to security in the maritime domain has been met by increased efforts on 
a more macro-level to map out a ‘maritime security studies’ agenda, and establish 
associated academic infrastructure.i To date this has been a relatively organic and 
nascent attempt by a growing body of academics to make sense of and explore this 
conceptual shift simultaneously reifying it.  
 
1. Figure 1 – Maritime Security Matrix (Source:  Bueger 2015:161) 
 
 
 
The most prominent contribution to date on the debate around maritime security studies 
has come from Christian Bueger. His article, ‘What is Maritime Security?’, places the 
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broadening of the maritime security concept in some historical context; it rightly 
acknowledges that maritime security has no agreed definition and is one of the latest 
‘buzz words’ in International Relations; and it lays out three different frameworks 
where conceptual commonalities and differences can be explored (Bueger 2015:159-
160). In the first framework Bueger maps maritime security (see Figure 1 above) in 
relation to other, related concepts such as seapower, the blue economy and resilience. 
In the second framework, Bueger draws upon the well-established securitisation 
framework to explore how threats to maritime security may be constructed. Finally, 
Bueger draws upon security practice theory to argue that studying what actors do when 
claiming they are enhancing maritime security can also offer insights in to the reality 
of maritime security. Bueger suggests that the three frameworks should be used 
collectively if we are to more fully explore and map the concept (Bueger 2015:160-2). 
It is this desire to explore and map the concept of maritime security, here in the specific 
context of Indonesia, which underpinned the first phase of the project and led to the 
development of a TNA targeted at key state maritime actors in the country. In 
examining the assessment’s results, this paper does then contribute an additional case 
study through which our understanding of maritime security today is further enhanced. 
 
3. Methodology: The Training Needs Analysis 
 
Before discussing the TNA’s results it is appropriate to first elaborate upon how it was 
initiated alongside its methodology. The consortium behind the TNA emerged out of 
facilitating efforts, started in December 2014, by IOM/Indonesia and the Centre for 
Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) at Coventry University, to kick-start a 
process of reflecting on Indonesia’s maritime security. This aspiration was strongly 
supported by the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP). An initial 
focus group discussion was organised for April 2015 in Jakarta with four universities - 
Coventry University, Gadjah Mada University (UGM), the University of Indonesia 
(UI), and the Indonesia Defence University (UNHAN) - co-convening and facilitating 
discussions. The objective of the first focus group discussion was broad as practitioners 
were brought together in order to develop policy recommendations to address maritime 
insecurities in the country. Here the most significant recommendations, agreed by 
consensus and documented in the post-event report, highlighted the undeniable need 
for capacity-building for maritime law enforcement and other stakeholders, as well as 
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for the need to coordinate at a regional and international level on maritime security 
affairs (IOM 2015a:2).   
 
These recommendations were given greater impetus as the trafficking and forced labour 
incidents in Ambon and Benjina gained increasing prominence in the media (The 
Jakarta Post 2015, Salim 2015). Here was clear evidence of the need for developing the 
required capacities in order to address similar incidents, whilst the transnational nature 
of the incidents illustrated the importance of improving coordination between all levels 
of governance. Against this backdrop a follow-up focus group discussion took place in 
September 2015 and the outcome was the establishment of a consortium where key 
maritime security stakeholders in Indonesia would have a platform to host further focus 
group discussions, develop a common understanding on maritime security issues, 
improve the levels of interagency cooperation, collaboration and interaction, and 
explore ways to facilitate knowledge transfer for joint training activities (IOM 2015d). 
Initial membership of the consortium was diverse and included three governmental 
departments (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), Ministry of Politics, 
Law, and Security, and the Directorate General of Immigration); law enforcement 
agencies (Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA), Indonesian National Police / 
Marine Police, Indonesia Sea and Rescue Agency, and Custom and Excise); the 
Indonesian Navy; academia (Gadjah Mada University (UGM), University of Indonesia 
(UI), and the Indonesia Defence University (UNHAN)); alongside the think tank the 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).  
 
A commitment to conduct a TNA was one of the first action points of the consortium 
and, along with the focus group discussions convened, represented the first phase of the 
capacity-building project. The TNA was directed towards all relevant state maritime 
security institutions in Indonesia “…in order to specify prospective, priority capacity-
building activities for each and every partner agency” (IOM 2015c). Whilst the TNA 
was intended to collect data on what different actors felt their training needs were, it 
also sought to place those needs in context by asking respondents to reflect on the status 
of the maritime security threat environment and the extent of their cooperation and co-
ordination with other stakeholders. Collectively the TNA would then enable the 
consortium to better understand how the Indonesian state thought about maritime 
security – threats and responses – providing data with which the most appropriate ways 
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in which capacity might be improved could begin to be mapped. The TNA report was 
distributed and presented jointly by IOM/Indonesia and the CTPSR at a focus group 
discussion in April 2016.   
 
The data within the TNA was collected by IOM/Indonesia. This decision stemmed from 
the continuous physical presence of its staff in the country, as well as the availability 
of native language speakers who could more easily access non-English speaking 
Indonesian officials for data collection purposes. Through desk research ten target state 
actors were pinpointed as having a potential role to play in addressing the five maritime 
security priorities that had been highlighted by the consortium in its focus group 
discussions. These challenges were, in order of priority:3 
 
(1) Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) fishing,  
(2) National maritime policy/strategy,  
(3) Robust law enforcement/combat corruption,  
(4) Smuggling in the maritime domain,  
(5) Capacity-building. 
 
The ten targeted actors meanwhile were the: 
 
(1) Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs,  
(2) Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law, and Security,  
(3) Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA),  
(4) Navy (TNI AL),  
(5) Indonesian National Police,  
(6) Dir. Gen. Sea Transportation (Hubla),  
(7) Dir. Gen. Custom and Excise (Bea and Cukai),  
(8) Dir. Gen. of Immigration (Ditjenim),  
(9) Ministry of Marine and Fisheries (KKP),  
(10) Indonesia Sea and Rescue Agency (BASARNAS). 
                                                     
3 Priority #2 was inclusive of a) promotion of maritime security, development of policies, and b) coherent concept of maritime 
security studies. Priority #5 was inclusive of: a) human resources; b) science and technology; c) institutional issues / development; 
d) network of stakeholders; e) pool of experts in maritime security; f) infrastructure for security and law enforcement; g) training 
courses in maritime security studies; h) build international / regional partnership, engaging international organizations; and i) 
simplify bureaucracy and rule of law (IOM 2016: 4). 
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Data collection was conducted from November 2015 to January 2016. Questionnaires 
and interviews were utilised to capture insights from targeted personnel in each 
institution with three high ranking officials selected for interview or to write an essay, 
whilst questionnaires were distributed to 30 personnel in each institution. Efforts were 
made to target individuals who allocated resourcing within institutions for the 
interview/essay, whilst the questionnaires were targeted at a mixture of strategic 
decision makers, human resource staff, and frontline personnel within each institution. 
The specific options respondents could choose from in the questionnaire varied from 
question to question and are elaborated further in the next section of the paper. Six of 
the ten actors replied providing 66 questionnaires and six essays to be evaluated. These 
six institutions were the Indonesian National Police, the Directorate General of 
Immigration, the Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA), the co-ordinating Ministry 
of Politics, Law, and Security, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), and 
the Indonesia Sea and Rescue Agency (BASARNAS). Whilst it is not possible therefore 
to argue that the TNA gives us a complete picture of the way in which the Indonesia 
state thinks about maritime security, the data collected does nevertheless, represent a 
significant leap forward in knowledge.  
 
 
The paper focuses on the questionnaire results and those elements of the TNA that 
sought to capture respondent’s views on the maritime security threat environment and 
current responses to insecurity as opposed to their desired training needs. As such the 
subsequent results section looks at how respondents understood the definition of 
maritime security, the actor’s mandate in relation to maritime security, threats 
associated with the maritime domain, and what part of Indonesia’s seas were deemed 
to be particularly vulnerable. The results section then considers which state actor 
respondents felt had a maritime security function, what responses to maritime insecurity 
were deemed relevant, and considers the role of coastal communities. The 
accompanying discussion of these TNA results draws upon insights on maritime 
security in general and in Indonesia specifically held by this paper’s authors, alongside 
the learning attained by one of the paper’s authors from their central role in co-
convening the first stage of the project. 
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4. Results and Discussion  
 
The diversity of the actors willing to inform the focus group discussions, particularly 
under the aegis of an international organisation – IOM/Indonesia - whose mandate is 
not directly related with insecurities in the maritime space, represents concrete evidence 
of the breadth and depth of interest in maritime security in Indonesia. With this diversity 
of actor in mind, the TNA sought to identify the extent to which there was a common 
understanding of, and approach to maritime security at the state level in Indonesia, a 
process that would subsequently shape planned training. Here a substantial 98% of 
respondents declared themselves ‘fully aware’, ‘aware’, or ‘somewhat aware’ of the 
concept of maritime security (IOM 2016: 6). This suggests that there is strong 
recognition that the maritime domain is a security space. That only 2% of total 
respondents were confident enough to suggest they were ‘fully aware’ of the concept 
however alludes to the need for additional elaboration (IOM 2016: 6) (See Fig.2 below). 
 
Figure 2: Understanding Maritime Security 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, whilst respondents were predominantly aware of maritime security as a 
concept, there was less confidence from these individuals about the specific role their 
institution had to play in relation to maritime security. 7% of respondents declared 
themselves ‘not aware’ at all about their institution’s mandate, whilst a further 26% of 
respondents were only ‘somewhat aware’ of their institution’s role (IOM 2016: 9) (See 
Fig. 3 below).  
1%
62%
35%
2%
Understanding of the Definition of 
Maritime Security
Fully Aware
Aware
Somewhat
Aware
Not Aware
N = 65
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Figure 3: Institutional Maritime Security Mandate 
 
 
 
Collectively these results emphasise that while maritime security is a buzz word that 
gains attention, this prominence does not necessarily mean there will be clarification 
across government as to its relevance in day-to-day operations. This conceptual blurring 
is not particularly surprising when we remind ourselves of the essentially contested 
nature of maritime security. Returning to Bueger, one way forward is to consider the 
way in which actors understand the threats associated with the maritime domain. Here 
the five maritime security priorities that emerged in the focus group discussions (see 
previous section) give an initial sense of direction with both IUU fishing and smuggling 
in the maritime domain deemed to be of concern. The TNA further illustrates the 
diversity of maritime security threats recognised by Indonesian state actors.  
 
Asked to select threats from the above list, plus the options ‘nothing’ and ‘do not know’, 
21% of respondents identified ‘IUU fishing/intentional damage to the marine 
environment’ as a predominant threat, the highest response. ‘Piracy and armed robbery’ 
was the threat selected by 19% of respondents and sat in second position. This 
highlights the way in which a variety of non-traditional threats sit alongside each other 
in the concerns of Indonesian state institutions. This mix is further emphasised when 
we consider that 17% of respondents flagged up ‘smuggling and trafficking of persons’ 
10%
57%
26%
7%
Institutional Mandate on Maritime Security
Fully Aware Aware Somewhat Aware Not Aware
N = 61
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by sea as a predominant threat, and 12% flagged up ‘terrorist acts’ involving ships (See 
Fig. 4 below)  
 
Figure 4: Maritime Security Threats in Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
To probe further the maritime security environment, respondents were also asked to 
reflect on the geographic priority areas selecting between the ‘territorial sea’, 
‘Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)’ and ‘maritime boundaries’. Whilst most 
respondents (35%) felt the ‘territorial sea’ was the highest priority, the results were 
balanced with 33% selecting the ‘EEZ’, and 29% ‘maritime boundaries’. This alludes 
to the high politics often associated with any sense of border, but recognises that those 
waters closer to land and thus the wider population, remain of principal concern. It also 
highlights awareness on the part of respondents to the interconnectedness of maritime 
security threats and their often transnational character. 
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Figure 5: Prioritisation of Maritime Space 
 
 
 
This complex threat perception picture in Indonesia is unsurprising when we consider 
the scale and diversity of the country’s maritime domain. With more than 17,500 islands 
to be policed and secured for example (Maps of World 2016), and the associated 
challenges this has for maritime domain awareness and interdiction activities, it seems 
of little surprise that respondents would recognise a whole host of potential threats that 
exploit this vast space. 
 
Shifting our emphasis on to how Indonesian state actors think about responses to 
maritime insecurity, the TNA provides further insights. When asked to reflect on which 
state actor, beyond their own, held the most important maritime security function in the 
country the ‘Navy’ was the most popular choice with 41% of respondents selecting it. 
This suggests that its prominence and influence within Indonesia is at such a level that 
other actors recognise its centrality. With non-traditional security threats focused upon 
in the TNA, the role of the Navy as a military body is something requiring more 
research. Beyond the Navy, four other actors representing a mixture of political and 
security actors were highlighted by respondents. Of further interest was that neither the 
‘Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries’ nor the ‘IUU Fishing Task Force’ were 
selected by respondents despite being included in the list of options. While respondents 
were only asked to select the actor which held the most important maritime security 
36%
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2%
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function, IUU fishing’s prominence as a perceived threat might have suggested a higher 
profile here (See Fig. 6 below). 
 
Figure 6: Maritime Security Agencies 
 
 
 
 
There was recognition amongst the TNA respondents of the need to look beyond the 
state. When asked to reflect on the most important actors within coastal communities, 
43% of respondents selected ‘tribal leaders in the fishing communities’, with 31% 
selecting ‘fishermen’ themselves (IOM 2016:13) (See Fig. 7 below).  
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Figure 7: Key Maritime Security Actors in Civil Society 
 
 
 
This emphasis on the fishing industry is not particularly surprising when we 
acknowledge the prominent people trafficking incidents on foreign fishing vessels that 
had garnered significant attention in Indonesia. The results do though represent some 
acknowledgement from state representatives that non-state actors may be referent 
objects of maritime security and play a role in responding to insecurity. Whilst local 
distinctiveness must always to be taken into account, the role of local tribal leaders’ 
within coastal communities for example, and their ability to garner support from 
community members, makes them an invaluable resource in combating transnational 
organised crime at the local level. Coastal communities understand their local 
environment best, and if they are engaged appropriately by state maritime security 
agencies, providing information on say, suspicious activity, a stronger security picture 
can be attained. It is a similar situation at sea where local fishermen may also have a 
unique insight into IUU fishing activities and other maritime security issues in their 
fishing grounds (IOM 2016:12). The emphasis on engaging with coastal communities 
also highlights recognition that the sea is not a hermetically sealed space, but rather 
insecurity at sea can stem from and find succour on land, alongside negatively 
impacting the wellbeing of innocent citizens. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The TNA provides a valuable glimpse in to how the concept of maritime security has 
been understood and utilised in practice by the Indonesian state. Although it is sensible 
not to over-claim from a single data set, the analysis of the TNA’s results in this paper 
has been shaped by nearly two years of insights about maritime security in Indonesia 
gained through the establishment of the consortium, and the delivery of the focus group 
discussions. The TNA highlights that the Indonesian state, driven forward by the 
maritime focus of its President, is increasingly recognising the importance of maritime 
security. Here prominent incidents of maritime crime such as those in Ambon and 
Benjina have undoubtedly given this emphasis more impetus. Beyond the recognition 
of the human suffering that such insecurities facilitate, for the Indonesian state they also 
have illustrated the inter-connected and transnational nature of maritime security. As 
the Indonesian Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, stated:  
 
“One of the reasons I prioritize the eradication of illegal fishing is 
not only because we are losing trillions of rupiah due to illegal 
fishing, but also because illegal fishing is often a vehicle for other 
crimes, such as people smuggling, drugs smuggling and slavery” 
(IOM 2015b:1). 
 
Taken alongside the diversity of maritime security threats highlighted in the TNA, and 
coupled with the acknowledgement of the role coastal communities can play; it seems 
clear that the early signs of a comprehensive maritime security agenda are evident in 
Indonesia. This mirrors broader conceptual developments where the widening and 
deepening of maritime security beyond military threats and the state has taken place, 
and the links between maritime security and other concepts such as sustainable 
development have begun to be explored (Germond 2016, Malcolm 2016a). 
 
Whether this more comprehensive maritime security agenda will take hold and become 
more institutionalised in Indonesia is difficult to tell. The lack of clarity over which 
institutions had a maritime security mandate serves as a reminder that the strategic and 
policy focus on the maritime domain within Indonesia must be communicated across 
government long term. The TNA’s recognition that the Navy remains the state actor 
with highest prominence in the maritime security field; and an acknowledgement that 
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there is a difference between recognising the role coastal communities can play and 
actually moving towards exploring and facilitating that, all suggests caution is needed. 
An emphasis on partnership building both within the state and between the state and 
non-state actors is likely to be important. Parts of the TNA not analysed in this paper 
do suggest that inter-agency co-operation exists both formally and informally between 
state actors (IOM 2016:13-23). Consistent dialogue about maritime security and the use 
of common conceptual frameworks between actors would be beneficial. Here the 
human security concept is particularly helpful in enhancing our understanding of the 
comprehensive maritime security agenda. 
 
Championed with such enthusiasm by the United Nations in the early 1990’s (UNDP 
1994), human security’s emergence came against the backdrop of increased recognition 
of the diversification of threats away from an emphasis on the nuclear threats of the 
Cold War to the standards of everyday living, human dignity, freedom, equality, justice 
and safety from threats such as lack of food, a lack of medicine, poverty and the 
nefarious constraints that affect everyday life (UNDP 1994; Dannreuther 2007). Human 
security’s emphasis on the individual as referent object of security enables us to better 
recognise community formations by these individuals above and below the state level. 
Its use of seven core sectors such as food, health or environmental security allows us to 
deconstruct and compartmentalise the totality of human relations and experience for 
analytical purposes, before re-aggregation enables us to more confidently evaluate the 
level of human security witnessed. While human security’s collective interest in 
freedom from fear, want and indignity demands that we recognise and explore the nexus 
between human experience on land and at sea, pushing us towards an examination of 
the causes of maritime insecurity, alongside its symptoms.ii It is a conceptual 
framework then well suited to explore and underpin Indonesia’s maritime security 
capacity-building efforts. 
 
Acknowledgements: 
 
Many thanks go to the International Organization of Migration Indonesia for allowing 
us to utilise the results of the maritime security Training Needs Analysis within the 
article. Working with IOM/Indonesia in this capacity-building project is an immense 
joy and their continued support is greatly appreciated.  
19 
 
 
The authors also wish to put on record our thanks to the Editor of Marine Policy, the 
anonymous reviewers and our colleagues Lisa Otto and Laura Payne for their feedback 
and comments on the article. Collectively they have helped to significantly improve its 
focus. 
 
References: 
 
AU [African Union] (2014), 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy, 
[online] available from http://pages.au.int/maritime/documents/2050-aim-strategy-0 
[accessed August 2016] 
 
Bueger, C. (2015) ‘What is Maritime Security?’, Marine Policy, 53, 159-164 
 
Bueger, C. (2013) ‘Communities of security practice at work? The emerging African 
Maritime Security Regime’, African Security, 6, 297–316 
 
Buzan, B. and Hansen, L. (2009) The evolution of international security studies. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Chapsos, I. (2016) 'Is Maritime Security a Traditional Security Challenge?' in Masys, 
A. J. (Ed) Exploring the Security Landscape: Non-Traditional Security Challenges. 
Springer International Publishing Switzerland, ch. 4, p.59-78 
 
Chapsos, I. and Kitchen C. (eds) (2015) Strengthening Maritime Security through 
Cooperation, Vol. 122 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series, E: Human and 
Societal Dynamics, Amsterdam: IOS Press, Dordrecht: Springer 
 
Dannreuther R (2007) International security: the contemporary agenda. Polity, 
Cambridge 
 
EU [European Union] (2014) European Union Maritime Security Strategy [online] 
available from 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INIT 
[accessed August 2016] 
 
Fierke, K.M. (2007) Critical approaches to international security. Polity, Cambridge. 
 
Germond (2016) Ocean Governance, Maritime Security and Sustainable 
Development: Towards a Holistic Approach. European Commission, Directorate-
General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries: Consultation on International Ocean 
Governance [online] available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/maritimeaffairs_fisheries/consultations/ocean-
governance/contributions/doc/germond_en.pdf [accessed 15 Nov. 2016] 
 
20 
 
Germond, B. (2015) The geopolitical dimension of maritime security, Marine Policy, 
54, 137-142 
 
Germond, B. (2015a) The Maritime Dimension of European Security: Seapower and 
the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Germond, B. and Germond-Duret, C. (2016) Ocean governance and maritime security 
in a placeful environment: The case of the European Union, Marine Policy, 66, 124-
131 
 
IOM (2016) ‘Training needs analysis (TNA) on maritime security’, The Consortium 
for Maritime Security in Indonesia, March 2016 
 
IOM (2015a) ‘FGD on Maritime Security Issues in Indonesia’, Post-Event Report, 
Jakarta: April 2015 
 
IOM (2015b) ‘Human Trafficking in the Fishery Sector: The Benjina Case’, Maritime 
Security, June 2015, Issue 7 
 
IOM (2015c) ‘Building Partnership for Indonesian Maritime Security’ Partners’ 
Workshop Post Event Report, Jakarta: September 2015 
 
IOM (2015d) ‘IOM, Indonesia Cooperate on Maritime Security as Trafficking 
Victims Head Home’, International Organisation for Migration [online] available 
from http://www.iom.int/news/iom-indonesia-cooperate-maritime-security-
trafficking-victims-head-home [accessed 10 Nov. 2016] 
 
Jakarta Globe (2014) Jokowi’s Inaugural Speech as Nation’s Seventh President 
[0nline] available from http://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowis-inaugural-speech-nations-
seventh-president/ [accessed 17 Nov. 2016] 
 
Kraska, J. (2015) ‘The Nine Ironies of the South China Sea Mess’, The Diplomat 
[online] available from http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-nine-ironies-of-the-south- 
china-sea-mess/ [accessed August 2016] 
 
Liss, C. (2016) ‘PMSCs in maritime security and anti-piracy control’, in Rita 
Abrahamsen & Anna Leander (eds), Routledge Handbook of Private Security Studies, 
Routledge, Oxon; New York 2016, chapter 6. 
 
Malcolm, J.A. (2016) ‘Responding to international terrorism: The securitisation of the 
United Kingdom’s ports’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 
18(2) 443-462. 
 
Malcolm, J.A. (2016a) Mapping Maritime Security: A Small Island Developing State 
Perspective? ‘Oceans Governance Conference’, held 31 March – 1 April 2016 at 
Hague Institute. Hague, Netherlands. 
 
Maps of World (2016) ‘Indonesia Facts’ [online] available from 
http://www.mapsofworld.com/indonesia/facts.html [accessed 15 Nov. 2016] 
 
21 
 
Murphy, M. N. (2009) Small boats, weak states, dirty money: the challenge of piracy, 
New York: Columbia University Press 
 
Octaviana, R. (2014) Indonesian Perspective: Illegal Unreported Unregulated (IUU) 
Fishing, LAP Lambert Academic publishing 
 
Salim, T. (2015) More trafficking cases uncovered, The Jakarta Post [online] 
available from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/15/more-trafficking-
cases-uncovered.html [accessed 18 Nov. 2016] 
 
Shortland, A. (2012) ‘Treasure Mapped: Using Satellite Imagery to Track the 
Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy’. Chatham House, Africa Programme Paper: 
AFP PP 2012/01 
 
Shekhar, V. and Chinyong Liow, J. (2014) ‘Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi's 
Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead’, Brookings [online], available from 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2014/11/indonesia-maritime-liow-shekhar 
[accessed 6 July 2016] 
 
Suarez de Vivero, J. L. and Rodriguez Mateos, J. C. (2010) Ocean governance in a 
competitive world. The BRIC countries as emerging maritime powers—building new 
geopolitical scenarios. Marine Policy, 34 (5), 967-978  
 
The Jakarta Post (2015) Seven arrested in Benjina case [online] available from 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/12/seven-arrested-benjina-case.html 
[accessed 18 Nov. 2016] 
 
Till, G. (2009) ‘The Constituents of Sea Power’ in Till, G. Seapower: a guide for the 
21st Century, Chapter 4. 
 
UK [United Kingdom] (2014) The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security, 
London 
 
UNDP (1994) Human development report. United Nations, New York 
 
 
i For example there has been the creation of a Maritime Security section at the WISC (2014) and the 
EISA (2015) annual conferences both co-ordinated by Christian Bueger (Cardiff) and James A. 
Malcolm (Coventry). Cardiff University runs the website www.piracy-studies.org, whilst Coventry 
University have launched a regular Maritime Security Briefing available online from 
http://www.coventry.ac.uk/marsec-briefings  
ii The relationship between insecurity at sea and development efforts on land was explored in a two-
year Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funded seminar series organised by Coventry 
University. Further details can be located at: www.maritimeseminars.co.uk . 
                                                     
